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A discussion of the market and policy failures associated with  
the adoption of herbicide-tolerant crops 
 
 
Abstract. Weed control in the U.S. Midwest has become increasingly herbicide-centric due to 
the adoption of herbicide-tolerant (HT) crops in the 1990s. That integrated weed management 
(IWM) practices, including ecological and mechanical controls, are scarcely used is 
concerning. IWM would be a more sustainable form of farming for two reasons. First, it would 
reduce the negative health and environmental externalities associated with herbicide use. 
Second, it would reduce the selection pressure on weed populations and the development of 
weed resistance to some herbicides, thereby reducing the uncertainty of the long-term 
effectiveness of herbicidal weed control. In this context, we develop an economic framework to 
clarify the interplay among the different market failures that either contribute to the herbicidal 
“lock-in” or make it problematic. We then analyse the evidence for and perceptions of these 
market failures based on twenty-four semi-structured interviews with farmers and experts 
conducted in 2017, as well as on discussions in the academic literature. To this end, we put into 
perspective the possible self-reinforcing effects in the adoption path of HT crops, such as 
increasing farm size, changes in farm equipment, increasing incentives for simplified crop 
rotations, and the loss of practical knowledge of IWM practices. 
Keywords: herbicide-tolerant crops; integrated weed management; health and environmental 
externalities; weed resistance; lock-in 
 
1. Introduction 
Weeds in farm fields can deprive crops of water, nutrients, and light, and so lower crop yields. 
In the U.S. Midwest, the region of the world studied in this article, chemical herbicide 
application rapidly became the central method of weed control after it was developed in the 
1930s. Up through the 1990s, weed control relied on selective herbicides, each working on 
particular groups of weeds. These herbicides were used in combination with mechanical 
methods for weed control, consisting of tillage and cultivation. In the late 1990s, the advent of 
herbicide-tolerant (HT) crops, mainly with tolerance to glyphosate, further simplified weed 
control. Glyphosate is a nonselective herbicide, controlling many different types of plant species 
by inhibiting an enzyme necessary for plant growth. Glyphosate-tolerant (GT) crops, developed 
through genetic modification, carry the gene coding for a glyphosate-insensitive form of this 
enzyme, obtained from a soil bacterium, and conferring crop tolerance to glyphosate once 
incorporated into the plant genome. They allowed farmers to spray fields with glyphosate after 
crop emergence, and so kill weeds without killing the crop, notably reducing the need for 
mechanical weed control. In 2017, GT crops covered 94% and 89% of U.S. soybean and corn 
areas, respectively, almost entirely replacing previous conventional crop varieties treated with 
selective herbicides. 
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Two sustainability issues confront herbicide-centric methods of weed control. First, the 
scientific literature shows that pesticides, among them herbicides, often have harmful health and 
environmental effects (Pimentel, 2009). Second, the repeated use of herbicide-centric methods 
often leads to weed resistance to the herbicides used (Duke, 1996), reducing their effectiveness 
over time, and indeed weed resistance to glyphosate is rapidly increasing (Heap and Duke, 
2018). Thus far, farmers have mainly controlled resistant weeds by applying selective herbicides 
in addition to glyphosate on GT crops (Bonny, 2016). Agrochemical companies have also 
recently developed HT crop varieties that are tolerant to selective herbicides in addition to 
glyphosate; crops tolerant to dicamba herbicide were commercialized in 2017 and crops tolerant 
to 2,4-D were commercialized in 2018. However, while increasing resistance to the selective 
herbicides used to supplement glyphosate seems inevitable, no new herbicide modes of action 
have been discovered for more than thirty years (Heap and Duke, 2018). It is not certain that 
herbicide manufacturers will be able to develop new synthetic products with new modes of 
action that can effectively control weeds and pass the increasingly demanding regulatory 
requirements aimed at controlling their effects on human health and the environment (Duke, 
2012). 
Integrated weed management (IWM) is an alternative to herbicide-centric weed control, 
and it at least partially addresses both sustainability issues. IWM integrates multiple weed 
management methods, including not only chemical and mechanical weed control, but also 
ecological methods such as crop rotation, cover-cropping, intercropping, planting of competitive 
cultivars, and the biological control of weeds with insects and pathogens. However, wide-scale 
IWM implementation would require major changes from current cultivation practices and likely 
worsen farmers’ complexity and costs of weed management. Indeed, ecological weed control 
has diminished over time; currently, it is used only marginally. The great majority of 
Midwestern farmers today rotate corn and soybeans; longer rotations involving wheat, oats and 
alfalfa are extremely rare. 
In this context, our aim is to describe the factors that may hinder widespread movement 
away from the use of HT technology for weed management towards a more sustainable form of 
agriculture relying on IWM. More precisely, we seek to analyse the extent to which the 
increased reliance on HT technologies may have generated self-reinforcing effects, making the 
adoption of IWM practices more difficult and costly than would have been the case had 
herbicide-resistant crops never been developed. Mortensen, Egan, Maxwell, Ryan, & Smith 
(2012) proposed that the development of crops tolerant to multiple herbicides leads to a decline 
in the science and practice of IWM and that the increased consolidation of the seed and 
chemical industries is making it more difficult for growers to find high-yielding varieties that do 
not also contain transgenic herbicide resistance traits. They also argue that the marketing of 
cultivars tolerant to 2,4-D and dicamba may compel nearly all growers in a region to adopt them 
once some critical mass of growers in the region adopts them. In fact, soybeans and corn are 
extremely sensitive to 2,4-D and dicamba, and non-tolerant soybeans and corn could be injured 
by the application drift of 2,4-D and dicamba from other fields. This “lock-in” of HT technology 
has not been considered in the more general literature attempting to gauge the welfare impacts 
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of HT technology adoption. 
The concept of lock-in has been used in several discussions related to agriculture 
(Cowan and Gunby, 1996; Magrini et al., 2016; Vanloqueren and Baret, 2008; Wilson and 
Tisdell, 2001). We complement this literature by presenting a framework for the discussion of 
the market and policy failures associated with weed control, including the common-pool nature 
of weed susceptibility to herbicides and the environmental and health externalities of herbicides. 
We also introduce a framework for examining lock-in, different from those presented in 
previous articles. We base our framework on the concepts of switching costs, network effects, 
path dependence in innovation possibilities, and policy persistence. We then use this framework 
in a discussion of the evidence for and perceptions of the market and policy failures that 
accompany the use of HT technologies and the barriers to IWM. We base the discussion on 
evidence from academic articles, public information, and 24 interviews conducted with 
university experts, regulators, and farmers in 2017. 
 
2. Weed-Control Market and Policy Failures 
2.1. Previous Analyses of HT Crop Adoption Neglect Certain Types of Failure 
An abundance of the economic literature examines the effects of adopting HT crops in terms of 
changes in production and management costs, farm profits, the profits of upstream seed and 
herbicide suppliers, and consumer surplus. For the U.S., empirical studies have mainly focused 
on HT soybeans, and used market equilibrium models to analyse the welfare effects of adoption 
(e.g., Price, Lin, Falck-Zepeda, & Fernandez-Cornejo, 2003). This literature concludes that the 
production cost savings from HT crops lead to aggregate welfare gains.  
Though not always accounted for in empirical studies, two HT-market failures have been 
studied thoroughly in the theoretical agricultural economics literature. First, the monopoly rights 
granted for GT seeds have allowed the innovator to extract monopoly rents (Moschini and 
Lapan, 1997). Second, some perceive foods derived from GMOs to be of inferior quality, and 
the costs of segregation and identity preservation of non-GMOs create a market failure 
(Desquilbet and Bullock, 2009). 
Other possible types of market failure associated with HT crop adoption have received 
less attention in the economic literature. First, most of the said literature predated significant 
weed resistance and considered only the short-term cost savings. Second, the negative health 
and environmental externalities of herbicides were ignored. Third, possible dynamic 
inefficiencies caused by self-reinforcing effects in an ex-post inefficient direction were under-
considered. These market failures are discussed below. 
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2.2. Weed Susceptibility to Herbicides Is a Common-Pool Resource 
Hueth and Regev (1974) initiated the economic literature on pest and weed resistance 
management. In economic terms, herbicide use involves joint management of two natural 
resources: the weed population, a detrimental renewable resource, and the stock of susceptibility 
(non-resistance) of the weed population to herbicides, a beneficial resource. Optimal herbicide 
application presents an intertemporal trade-off between controlling the present weed population 
and preserving future herbicide susceptibility. Because weed seeds and pollens escape their 
fields of origin, farmers enjoy the immediate benefit of herbicidal weed control but share weed 
susceptibility and future weed populations as common-pool resources. In economic terms, the 
lack of property responsibility for weed populations and property rights to weed susceptibility 
creates a market failure: the market cannot optimally allocate, spatially or temporally, the two 
resources (Ambec and Desquilbet, 2012). Coordination or regulation may be warranted to 
provide individual farmers with incentives to apply resistance management strategies best-suited 
for the farm community. However, no U.S. laws or regulations currently attempt to offset the 
market failures just described. We examine causes of the dearth of regulations in section 3. 
2. 3. Herbicides Create Negative Health and Environmental Externalities 
Herbicides are detrimental to human health and to the environment, although the extent of this 
externality is hard to quantify, varies by herbicide, and depends on the interactive effects of the 
different chemicals in the applied herbicide “cocktail” (Bourguet and Guillemaud, 2016). The 
adoption of IWM practices would reduce herbicide use and therefore these negative externalities 
(Davis, Hill, Chase, Johanns, & Liebman, 2012). 
More evidence exists of the health effects of pesticides for agricultural workers than for 
the general population. Occupational exposures to pesticides are linked to a number of different 
cancers (Alavanja and Bonner, 2012). Herbicides may also be associated with health outcomes 
other than cancer for agricultural workers: for example, Shrestha et al. (2018) found evidence of 
an increased risk of hypothyroidism associated with the 2,4-D, dicamba and glyphosate 
herbicides. Herbicides also impact the aquatic life, affecting the biological processes and 
biodiversity in water (Davis, Hill, Chase, Johanns, & Liebman, 2012), and may be deleterious to 
soil microbial communities, soil biochemical reactions and soil enzymes (Hussain et al., 2009).  
The academic literature on the economic impacts of HT crops usually considers 
glyphosate to be more environmentally benign than the herbicides it replaces, thereby reasoning 
that the adoption of HT crops has provided environmental benefits (e.g., Nelson and Bullock, 
2003). However, the environmental and health impacts of glyphosate-based herbicides are 
currently subject to controversy, notably sparked after the International Agency for Research on 
Cancer (2017) classified glyphosate as a probable human carcinogen. The main points of 
controversy pertain to the greater effect of glyphosate and co-formulants in glyphosate-based 
herbicide formulations than of glyphosate alone and to the influence of the datasets and methods 
used to evaluate the toxicological effects (Benbrook, 2019).  In addition, in a context where 
limitations in the number of agricultural workers included in cohort or control-case studies and 
6  
in the measure of their exposures make it difficult to document the effect of particular 
pesticides, recent articles in epidemiology concluded that glyphosate was associated with an 
elevated risk of some types of lymphoma (Leon et al., 2019; Zhang, Rana, Shaffer, Taioli, & 
Sheppard, 2019).  
2.4. A Dynamic Market Failure: Lock-in and Its Causes 
Arthur (1989) defines “lock-in” as occurring when a technology gains, even if by chance, a 
market advantage over competing technologies, and ends up dominating the market, even 
though it might not be more efficient. In our context, when herbicides or HT technology were 
first commercialized, both consistently provided higher farm profits than could IWM. However, 
this accounting neglects the costs of the negative externalities of herbicide use. Additionally, the 
spread of weed resistance lowers the profitability of herbicidal weed control. Our focus below is 
on the self-reinforcing effects (“lock-in”) of the herbicide and HT technologies, which may have 
contributed to the dominance of herbicidal weed control. 
Below, we present a framework featuring four causes of lock-in: switching costs, 
network effects, dependence of the innovation possibilities frontier, and policy persistence. 
2.4.1. Switching Costs and Network Effects 
The industrial organization literature discusses switching costs and network effects as the 
principal causes of customer lock-in to early choices. As defined by Klemperer (1995), “a 
switching cost results from a consumer’s desire for compatibility between his current purchase 
and a previous investment”, independent of other customers’ choices. In contrast, network 
effects are self-reinforcing effects coming from the influence of each customer’s decisions on 
other customers: “network effects arise where current users of a good gain when additional 
users adopt it” (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). There are two types of network effects. Direct 
network effects arise if adoption by different users is complementary. A typical example is 
when users of a communication network directly benefit from its adoption by others because 
they have more opportunities for interactions with peers. Indirect network effects arise through 
improved opportunities to trade with the other side of a market. 
Switching costs are socially detrimental when the tie between consumer transactions 
obstructs efficient buyer-seller matching. Switching costs and network effects may also limit the 
entry of new suppliers, creating a social cost of incompatibility (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). 
In addition, the negative externalities of herbicides imply a welfare loss if the switching costs 
and network effects hamper the adoption of IWM practices. 
2.4.2. Path Dependence in Innovation Possibilities 
Lock-in can also result from the path dependence of innovation possibilities, which arises if the 
existing stock of knowledge influences the type of knowledge developed. This happens when 
past technological advances make future advances more profitable, as current researchers “stand 
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on the shoulders” of their predecessors (Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, & Hemous, 2012). 
2.4.3. Policy Persistence 
Policy persistence is the tendency of a policy to be maintained or renewed, even when its 
original rationale no longer justifies continuance. Coate and Morris (1999) explain this bias 
towards the status quo as being the result of the adjustment costs that economic agents 
undertake to benefit from a policy. This costly response incentivises agents to persuade 
policymakers to maintain or renew an existing policy, even when the agents are ex-ante 
indifferent to competing policies. 
 
3. Evidence and Perceptions of the Market and Policy Failures 
3.1. Methodology 
We used the concepts developed above about market and policy failures associated with 
herbicidal weed control to design questions for one-hour, in-person, and semi-structured 
interviews. We conducted 24 interviews in 2017 with ten university experts (agricultural 
economists, weed and crop scientists, and extension specialists), five regulators from the EPA 
and USDA, the representative of a producer association, a crop consultant, and seven farmers. 
An extension specialist of University of Illinois helped to set up interviews with farmers 
of heterogenous farm sizes and farm ownership structures, and with the crop consultant. We 
initially sampled a group of fifteen university experts and six regulators or former regulators 
with recorded publications on the topic of HT crops, herbicide resistance, agricultural 
technology and IWM, as well as two environmental advocacy groups. Other prospective 
participants were selected through snowball sampling by asking interviewees to suggest, either 
in interview requests or in person, additional participants. In total, we contacted 25 experts from 
universities, three environmental advocacy organizations and ten regulators. Seventeen experts 
were finally interviewed, thirteen did not return emails, and eight were not available or declined. 
Most of those who declined suggested alternative contacts in the same department or institution. 
Most of the interviews, lasting between 45 minutes and an hour and a half, were conducted in 
person, and three were conducted via telephone or teleconference. All interviews were recorded 
with the permission of the participants. 
In this section, we analyse the evidence and perceptions of these market and policy 
failures in light of the interview responses, academic literature, and other available public 
information. 
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3.2. The Adoption Path of HT Crops 
3.2.1. Rapid and Widespread Adoption of GT Crops 
GT crops were commercialized during a period of increasing weed resistance to existing selective 
herbicides for Midwestern soybean and corn production—with increased resistance to ALS-inhibiting 
herbicides being a case in point (Shaner, 2014). This initial weed resistance fuelled GT crop adoption 
(Owen and Zelaya, 2005) but appears not to be the main driver of GT crop adoption, as illustrated by this 
answer given by a farmer when asked whether he experienced weed resistance to herbicides prior to the 
commercialization of GT technology: 
I don’t think so, I really don’t think so. I mean, it’s just that those other chemicals didn’t 
work as well. It was not resistance. It was just, “well, they may work, they may not,” 
depending on how big the weed was, when you sprayed, whether it cooled off that night, 
did you get a rain within a certain amount of hours, or they weren’t actively growing, 
they were partially drought-affected. And then RoundupTM came, and if you got part of 
that plant sprayed with Roundup, that baby was dead. It just worked. 
Indeed, the academic literature cites several initial economic advantages that fuelled the 
rapid adoption of GT crops (Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride, 2002). First, GT crops lowered 
weed-control costs. In addition to glyphosate being cheaper than the cocktail of selective 
herbicides it replaced, the costs of operator time and fuel were lower, as fewer tractor passes 
were needed in the fields each year. Weed identification (“scouting”) costs were also much 
lower because glyphosate controlled such a broad spectrum of weeds. Second, controlling 
weeds with glyphosate provided farmers with important time flexibility: glyphosate could kill 
larger weeds than selective herbicides, widening the time window for spraying, and thus 
lowering the risk of rain and mud keeping heavy machinery out of the fields while weeds grew 
too large to kill. Third, because glyphosate controlled such a wide range of weeds, GT 
technology greatly simplified weed management, saving valuable management time for other 
activities (Gardner, Nehring, & Neson, 2009). Fourth, GT technology made the mechanical 
control of weeds (with interrow cultivators) unnecessary. Fifth, the development of HT crops 
reduced the use of pre-plant tillage techniques, again saving operators time and money. Using 
1988-2006 state-level panel data, Fernandez-Cornejo, Hallahan, Nehring, Wechsler, and Grube 
(2012) found that HT adoption reinforced the adoption of conservation tillage practices. Perry, 
Moschini, and Hennessy (2016) reported that GT soybeans and conservation tillage are 
complementary practices. Finally, using data from a nationwide, early-2000s survey of soybean 
farmers, Fernandez-Cornejo, Hendricks, and Mishra (2005) found, after controlling for other 
factors, that adoption of HT soybeans was positively and significantly correlated with off-farm 
household income. 
Our interviewees discussed all aspects of the cost reductions mentioned above. One 
farmer summarized the general tenor of the conversations about incentives for GT technology 
adoption as follows: 
Economics. […] It worked, it flat worked. 
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Another farmer told us, 
It was a win-win situation that you didn’t even have to think about. You just filled the 
sprayer with Roundup, and you went to spray whatever needed to be sprayed. Simplicity 
was the greatest thing about it. Didn’t even have to think. 
A father and son collaborating on an Illinois farm made the significant savings of 
managerial resources allowed by HT technology abundantly clear: 
Son: I hate to make this statement—take it for what it is—but Roundup made the farmers 
that weren’t necessarily good on the things they should have been doing, it made them 
look like good farmers. 
Father: It forgave a lot of mistakes. Son: That’s a good way to put it. 
3.2.2. Changes in Fixed Capital: Farm Size and Equipment 
The interviewees made it clear that GT technology’s management resource savings and 
increased time flexibility not only provided the seasonal crop benefits described above, but also 
triggered changes over time in farmers’ decisions about fixed assets, lowering the demand for 
mechanical weed control equipment. In addition, almost all of the interviewees speculated that 
the flexibility and simplicity of using GT crops permitted farmers to expand their acreage and 
manage larger farms. One farmer stated, 
Yeah, I think that has definitely allowed the big guys to get bigger, sure. Because they go 
in and they plant, and then spray, and then harvest. 
However, the causality between GT crop adoption and increases in farm size is difficult 
to determine; many factors influence farm size. In theory, technological change may affect farm 
size through two channels: by allowing economies of scale of crop production (that is, by 
lowering the per-unit costs of output expansion) or through labour saving—that is, by reducing 
the labour needed for any given production quantity. Agricultural economists tend to judge the 
labour-saving aspects of technological change to be the more important. MacDonald, Korb, & 
Hoppe (2013) presented empirical evidence of time savings from GT technology, which they 
cite as playing an important role in the consolidation of crop farms since 1995 along with other 
technological changes such as larger farm equipment and faster tractors, as well as costs savings 
from new information technologies. 
3.2.3. Development of Weed Resistance to Glyphosate 
Soon after the introduction of HT technology, the industry producing glyphosate and HT seed 
frequently claimed that the HT system was different from selective herbicide systems in that 
biological resistance to HT technology would not evolve. For example, Bradshaw, Padgette, 
Kimball, & Wells (1997), all employees of Monsanto, claimed that “the complex manipulations 
that were required for the development of glyphosate-resistant crops are unlikely to be 
duplicated in nature to evolve glyphosate-resistant weeds” (see Bonny (2016), for other 
examples). This claim falls under what sociologists have coined “the economics of techno-
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scientific promises” (Joly, 2010). As an academic researcher we interviewed opined: 
Many people drank the Kool-Aid that Monsanto was serving that said, “Oh, this is a 
really complex way that the glyphosate kills weeds, so resistance will never evolve.” 
They forgot to read Darwin and Wallace. 
Indeed, the initial claims that resistance would not develop were wrong. Currently, three 
weeds are displaying significant glyphosate resistance in Midwest fields: tall waterhemp 
(Amaranthus tuberculatus (Moq.) Sauer), giant ragweed (Ambrosia trifida L.), and marestail 
(Erigeron canadensis L.). 
Given that weed susceptibility to glyphosate is a common-property resource among 
farmers (as weed resistance may diffuse spatially via weed seeds or pollen), even if they had 
been aware from the start of the risks of resistance, farmers would not have had individual 
incentives to develop management strategies to delay it. The current aggregate farm structure 
also makes it difficult for farmers to cooperate with each other; interviewees told us that current 
farms are sometimes so large, with fields of single farms spread out over as much as one 
hundred miles, that producers may not even know their neighbours, and compete to rent or buy 
land. Additionally, most Midwestern farm land is rented, and growers who do not own their 
land have less incentive to account for the long-term development of resistant weeds. Several 
interviewees also highlighted farmers’ faith in technology and their beliefs that either companies 
will offer new solutions or old solutions will work again: 
Farmer. I think there’s always going to be a chemical to kill certain things. 
Interviewer. You think the industry can develop new chemicals if we come to that? 
Farmer. Oh yeah, I’m sure they can. Some of the older chemicals we may not be able to 
use anymore because weeds are tolerant to them. If you have a certain chemical that does 
not kill a weed anymore, you go to a different chemical, and if that one does not kill it 
anymore, you come back to another chemical. There’s always a circle that if you wait 
long enough it will do it again. 
In contrast to the regulation of insect-resistant Bt crops, which imposed a mandatory 
refuge policy from the start to manage resistance in target pests, no regulation has been 
established for HT crops even though the topic was briefly considered in House hearings in 
2010 (US House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010). Our interviews 
highlighted several reasons for regulatory differences among genetically modified crops. First, 
the regulatory context is different: contrary to Bt crops, GT crops contain no toxin added by 
genetic engineering at which regulation could be aimed. Furthermore, the EPA determined that 
because Bt crops lowered pesticide use, Bt susceptibility was a public good. In contrast, the 
perception was that GT crops were introduced to simplify growers’ lives, rather than decrease 
herbicide use. Additionally, different EPA divisions regulate Bt crops and HT crops, and there 
was little internal push for regulation of the latter. Furthermore, whereas entomologists were 
actively pushing for a public strategy to establish refuges, weed scientists were more focused on 
weed control than weed ecology and, by and large, did not call for HT crop regulation. Finally, 
providing incentives to farmers to create refuges for Bt crops can be relatively simple. No 
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equivalent simple policy has been identified to manage the development of weed resistance; 
IWM solutions are more complex and more costly to implement, and they vary depending on 
the specific context. The EPA has recently developed guidelines on resistance development for 
pesticide labels and educational materials for farmers (U.S. EPA, 2017a, 2017b). However, the 
EPA is not contemplating mandatory policies, which would be more likely to have a sizeable 
influence on the evolution of weed resistance. 
3.2.4. Current Tools to Fight Resistant Weeds 
The current strategies for controlling glyphosate-resistant weeds are mainly herbicide-centric, 
and they include increasing doses of glyphosate, supplementing glyphosate with other 
herbicides, and using transgenic dicamba- or 2,4-D-resistant crops. 
Glyphosate- and dicamba-tolerant Roundup Ready XtendTM soybeans were 
commercialized in 2017. EnlistTM or Enlist DuoTM soybeans and corn, tolerant to 2,4-D alone 
and to 2,4-D and glyphosate, respectively, were commercialized in 2018 (after our interviews). 
The adoption rate of dicamba-tolerant soybeans in the U.S. was approximately 20% in 2017.1 
Our interviews indicated that many farmers judge dicamba to be less effective than glyphosate 
because dicamba does not control grasses and is ineffective on large weeds. In addition, because 
of dicamba’s tendency to drift to neighbouring farms, in 2017 several of the interviewed farmers 
avoided these crops for fear of problems with neighbours. As summarized by an interviewed 
academic, the more fundamental problem is that weeds will evolve resistance to dicamba: 
Both of those, the 2,4-D and the dicamba, are relatively old products—some of the oldest. 
They haven’t had widespread usage and so the level of evolved resistance to those 
herbicides is quite low, so they are like maybe a band-aid for a short period of time. But it 
is still a system based on herbicides. 
Application of herbicide mixtures might mitigate the evolution of weed resistance, as 
long as resistance to the active ingredients has not already evolved, but resistance mitigation 
would exacerbate health and environmental costs. An academic interviewee stated, 
I think the industry’s approach to it—and I have misgivings about this—is that we throw 
on more herbicides. If you get a new herbicide coming to the market now, it’s always a 
two-or three-way mixture of different herbicide active ingredients, with the hope that if I 
have enough tools in the jug, then I’m going to be able to manage that problem. The 
negative to me from that is that we are using more pesticides than we were before, which 
has environmental implications. But if you look at the models, it’s probably the smartest 
way to approach the resistance problem because weeds are less likely to survive a mixture 
than a single active ingredient. 
It is possible to complement the chemical control of resistant weeds with mechanical 
control, including one or possibly two pre-plant tillage passes (one in the early spring and the 
other immediately before planting, to control emerged weeds). Several farmers had begun using 
 
1 See https://extension.psu.edu/looking-back-at-xtend-soybean-and-changes-for-2018. 
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their old interrow cultivators again on localized parts of their farms where resistant weeds were 
problematic. However, the relatively small sizes of the old cultivators greatly slowed the 
production process. For example, one farmer explained that he had cultivated a few acres with 
an old, six-row cultivator even though his newer planter could cultivate 16 rows. Therefore, 
more time was consumed cultivating six rows up the field, six rows back, and then four rows up 
again. Contemplating the effort required to cultivate more than the marginal areas he had 
cultivated that year, he remembered the consequences of cultivating as a younger farmer: 
My hearing is bad because of that cultivation. […] It was no fun, and it took the whole 
summer up. Just a pain. 
There is currently no significant IWM adoption in the U.S. Midwest. Farmers 
overwhelmingly consider IWM to be insufficiently effective, and too complex, time consuming 
and costly. An academic interviewee provided an apt summary: 
Herbicides work, for the most part. They’re inexpensive, it’s easy. Doing something like 
rotating crops would help reduce the number of weeds, but it would not completely take 
care of weeds. You still would need herbicides, probably. “I can rotate and spray, or I can 
just spray. So I just spray.” The other available strategies require multiple strategies to be 
completely effective. You could do lots of things to get there, or you could do one thing: 
spraying herbicides. 
3.2. Barriers to IWM 
Given the negative externalities of herbicides, the inevitable development of weed resistance, 
and that no new herbicide modes of action seem to be in the research and commercial pipelines, 
the future methods and costs of weed control are worrying. Below, we discuss additional 
difficulties producers face when transitioning to IWM. 
3.2.1. Possible Barriers to Crop Rotation 
Although IWM is a combination of several practices, the consensus from our interviews was 
that 
[crop rotation is] the single most important strategy that it would be nice if we do more of, 
and that 
true IWM has to start with a good crop rotation; otherwise, you’re forcing the chemicals 
to do all the work. 
Longer crop rotations would be especially beneficial for corn and soybeans, given that 
they have similar planting dates, shared weed problems and corresponding shared herbicide 
strategies. However, there was a consensus among the interviewees that bringing additional 
crops into the current corn-soy rotation is currently “not really an option,” as corn and soybeans 
thrive in Midwestern growing conditions. As underlined by Liebman, Mohler, and Staver (2001) 
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(p. 191), larger farms are less suited for ecological weed management. Thus, increasing farm 
sizes have reinforced the efficiency of herbicidal weed control. Through our framework, we can 
interpret this as coming from differences in profitability and being exacerbated by lock-in. First, 
herbicides have made the removal of oats and alfalfa from rotations possible, which has further 
encouraged farm specialization in field crops and widened the disconnection between crop and 
animal production. Reintroducing these crops would be difficult in the current situation, as they 
are no longer compatible with the internal structure of farms without animal production—which 
is a type of switching cost. The absence of local markets for wheat, oats, and alfalfa also 
complicates the access to inputs suited for their production, and severely limits the ability of 
farmers using IWM to deliver their crops to local buyers; this is an indirect network effect. 
Cover-cropping could complement herbicidal weed control, but it is complicated, and increases 
weather-related risks. 
Corn and soybean production are incentivised by two principal government policies. 
First, the Renewable Fuels Standard mandates that the petroleum industry mix a minimum 
proportion of crop-based ethanol into the nation’s gasoline supply (U.S. EPA, 2018). As a 
result, approximately one-third of the nation’s total corn production went to the production of 
ethanol in 2016 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2018). This government-mandated demand for 
corn increases the world price of corn relative to that of other crops and thus encourages corn 
production. Second, subsidized crop insurance is the principal instrument used by the U.S. 
government to supplement the incomes of farmers in the corn-soybean belt. To some extent, the 
programme incentivises monocultural agriculture simply because it increases the already 
existing competitive advantage of corn and soybean production to that of other crops likely to be 
used in longer-term rotations in the U.S. Midwest. Crop insurance subsidies cover some small 
rotation crops—oats, for example—but not others, such as alfalfa (Zulauf, Schnitkey, Coppess, 
& Paulson, 2018). We can conjecture about a policy persistence effect: there have been 
relatively few regulatory obstacles to simplifying crop rotations; farmers’ current assets are 
compatible with herbicidal weed control in corn-soy rotations, making it more difficult 
politically to increase regulatory obstacles to herbicide development and use. 
3.2.2. Possible Barriers to Interrow Cultivation 
Our interviews resulted in detailed discussions about the use of interrow cultivation for weed 
suppression. Cultivation was discussed more as a complement to herbicide-centric weed control 
than as a component of IWM. The general thought expressed was that weed resistance may now 
be making such cultivation necessary, much as it was a necessary complement to selective 
herbicides prior to the adoption of HT crops. However, the barriers to interrow cultivation 
present a general difficulty for IWM practices beyond this specific case. This definitive answer 
came from a farmer when asked whether large-scale mechanical weed control would be an 
option in the case of resistance build-up: 
No … [laughs] I don’t think we’ll ever see that again! 
This response may be attributed to a switching cost resulting from increases in farm size, 
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which has created incompatibilities with interrow cultivation. Currently, the equipment industry 
lacks incentives to develop more efficient cultivators than the old ones still owned by some 
farmers, which creates an indirect network effect for a farmer who would want an efficient 
cultivator but cannot buy one because of a lack of general market demand. No doubt 
manufacturers could respond quickly to an increase in cultivator demand. Cultivators are 
relatively simple machines, manufactured at relatively low costs. However, cultivating 24  rows 
at a time would be challenging because the wider cultivator makes it more difficult to avoid 
digging up the crop along with the weeds. Interrow cultivation is also not very compatible with 
no-till methods, which can complement HT technology. 
Our interviewees told us that a sprayer can be driven at fifteen miles per hour across the 
fields, allowing the farmer to cover a number of acres very quickly and with little difficulty. 
Field cultivators typically must be driven from five to seven miles per hour, and the work is 
exacting; the driver must pay constant attention to the action behind him to avoid digging up the 
crop with the weeds. Of course, the costs of the farmer’s cultivation time and efforts might be 
defrayed by hired labour. However, our interviewees stressed that the pool of labour capable of 
cultivating efficiently and willing to take on the work is quite limited in rural Midwestern labour 
markets. 
Considering the discussion above, the prohibitive costs of interrow cultivation are not 
the fixed cost of buying new machinery, but rather the variable costs of the slow task of 
cultivation. An academic summarized the situation: 
I can spray a field much faster than I can cultivate it. 
While the cost of labour is exogenous to the dynamics of weed control and therefore not 
a factor in lock-in, the price of herbicides and thus the relative costs of labour and herbicides are 
possibly affected by the policy persistence of regulations encouraging herbicide use, as 
discussed before. This topic was beyond the scope of the interviews. 
3.2.3. Possible Barriers in Terms of Knowledge 
Another important barrier to large-scale IWM is the path dependence of innovation. Almost a 
generation of farmers have now farmed with GT crops, and know-how about selective herbicide 
management and field scouting is fading. However, our interviewees believed that knowledge of 
pre-GT practices has not yet completely disappeared and, though less accessible, is still 
available from land-grant universities and extension services, via the Internet, and through 
traditional communication outlets. Of course, the U.S. is reducing its public R&D in the agri-
food sector—a general trend that is largely exogenous to the dynamics of weed control. This 
public investment has decreased both in absolute terms and relative to private research; the 
expenses of agri-food R&D are now double the expenses of public R&D (Pardey, Chan-Kang, 
Dehmer, & Beddow, 2016). Farmers have begun substituting public extension services with 
services from private crop consultants and input retailers. 
Midwestern farmers’ knowledge of IWM practices was limited even before the advent of 
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GT technology; very few farmers chose IWM over selective herbicides. Nor has IWM been the 
focus of academic weed science, which has traditionally been herbicide-centric in its research 
and funding (Davis et al., 2009; Shaner and Beckie, 2014). Private companies now conduct a 
larger share of agri-food R&D than do public institutions, and they have greater incentive to 
investigate herbicide-centric rather than non-herbicidal weed control strategies. For example, 
current cover-crops research is primarily public; supply companies make scant profits selling 
cover crop seed. There is also inertia in research: there are sunk costs, and there is an incentive 
to exploit past investments in specific intellectual capital. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our analysis has highlighted that the current dominance of herbicide-centric weed control in 
crop farming in the U.S. Midwest is unlikely to fade any time soon in favour of a more 
sustainable form of agriculture relying on IWM. Indeed, IWM adoption faces high barriers to 
entry, including barriers to crop rotation, interrow cultivation, and knowledge acquisition. Some 
of these barriers seem mostly exogenous to the dynamics of weed control. First, corn and 
soybeans thrive in the agricultural conditions of the U.S. Midwest, reducing private economic 
incentives for other rotations. Second, the high cost of qualified rural labour hampers the 
adoption of more time-consuming IWM practices. Third, the increase in the relative share of 
private agri-food R&D compared with public R&D may decrease the incentives for IWM 
research because of low appropriability. 
Other barriers, however, are at least partly endogenous to the dynamics of weed control; 
they feature various self-reinforcing effects that contribute to the lock-in of herbicide-centric 
weed control. These lock-in effects help maintain the herbicide-centric path of weed control 
dynamics despite another externality at play, which is the common-pool nature of weeds and of 
weed susceptibility to herbicides. This common-pool nature contributes to the decrease in 
herbicides’ effectiveness over time as weed resistance develops. The negative externalities of 
herbicides on health and the environment make this path problematic. 
We have identified four types of self-reinforcing effects. First, incompatibilities of IWM 
practices with the current size of farms and farm machinery create switching costs. Existing 
machinery, such as the interrow cultivators made unnecessary by GT technology, are ill-suited 
for use with today’s larger machinery. Farm size is enhanced by the availability of herbicidal 
weed control; the large size of farms makes it difficult to adopt IWM practices, which tend to be 
labour- and management-intensive processes. Second, indirect network effects have resulted as 
chemical herbicides have contributed to the simplification of crop rotations, which no longer 
include fodder crops; this simplification has fostered the specialization and separation of field 
crop farms and livestock farms. The reintroduction of fodder crops on grain farms lacking 
livestock production would be challenging, and transporting fodder crops to livestock-intensive 
areas is expensive. Third, there is path dependence in R&D. IWM has never been the main 
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focus of weed science. Fourth, the U.S. biofuels mandate and subsidized crop insurance 
programmes encourage corn and soybean production, and therefore discourage longer crop 
rotations. Although it was not specifically addressed in our interviews, the policy persistence of 
regulations pertaining to the market authorization and use of herbicides probably also plays a 
role in the current price of herbicides and the high cost-effectiveness of herbicides compared 
with labour. 
The lock-in effects that we have described do not result from GT crop adoption alone but 
also more generally from the much longer path of herbicidal control. GT crops may have 
reinforced this herbicide-centric path by encouraging increases in farm acreage and machinery 
sizes, but the trends of larger farms and equipment were already in play long before the advent 
of GT crops. 
The prospects of whether herbicide-centric weed control will still dominate in the long 
run may depend on two factors. First, it will depend on whether agrochemical companies 
manage to develop new herbicide compounds as weed resistance to current herbicides increases. 
Second, increased knowledge and citizen awareness of the negative health and environmental 
impacts of herbicides could create political leverage to change farm policies, pesticide 
authorization procedures, and policies to support the development of alternative cropping 
systems, thus changing the incentives faced by farmers to so predominately rely on herbicides 
for weed control.  
We have provided a qualitative description of the dynamic effects at play in the path of 
GT crop adoption in the U.S. Midwest. Our economic analysis of the effects of the adoption of 
farm innovations has shown that dynamic relationships exist between weed management 
choices and choices about fixed farm assets such as land and equipment. It is therefore 
important to account not only for the variable costs at the field scale but also for the market-
scale structural transformations brought about by these innovations. This study also underlines 
the interest in comparing the effect of an innovation (for example, GT crops) not only with the 
dominant technology in place (in our case, herbicidal control) but also with more sustainable 
alternatives (such as IWM) that have beneficial effects on health and the environment. 
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